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Western history is largely a history of writing its own history.  From Thucydides, Livy and
Tacitus to our own time, most of what we call ‘History’ consists of ‘histories’ – events
situated in time and place to instruct contemporaries and posterity. With the Enlightenment,
however, questions start to arise as to whether ‘History’ is something more. Amidst what
are by that time innumerable ‘histories’, figures like Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche ask
about inherent patterns and therefore underlying meanings to History. Is History more than
just ‘one damn thing after another’, more than a never-ending cascade of disparate
narrations? Does anything about History shed light on the character of ‘the human
condition’ (if there is such a thing)? To be sure, writers like Herder and Savigny would cast
doubt on that ‘Big History’ enterprise, which, as such a roster of luminaries suggests, had
become a Teutonic obsession, given Germany’s post-Enlightenment anxieties.
With the advent of post-colonial theory, ‘Big History’ soon looked like little more than crude
generalisations about Europe – crudely projected onto all humanity. Yet, far from
dismantling speculation about ‘History’, those scepticisms have re-invigorated it. In calling
for greater nuance, they render all the more compelling questions about what we mean by
‘history’ and why we write and debate it.
Law as a normative system
The post-Cold War world has witnessed a flurry of scholarship about law and historical
memory, that is, about states’ recourse to legal means of shaping public consciousness
about the past. There is nothing new about the subject matter as such. Historians have
long observed how governments propagandise about the past, for example, by glorifying
founding fathers and battlefield scenes – or indeed by censoring voices that dissent from
official narratives.  Does this ‘new’ field of law and historical memory amount to nothing
more than legal academics dashing on a train driven by historians for a very long time?
The recent legal scholarship differs from familiar historians’ approaches precisely in the
ways that ‘Law’, as a specific object of study, differs from ‘History’ writ large. Law is an
overtly and pervasively normative social system.  It interweaves with broader political and
ethical contexts whilst nevertheless pursuing its characteristic logics and dynamics. To
identify law and historical memory as a scholarly area is to identify those processes as
germane to any detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which governments exercise
power to shape public consciousness. Of course, historians certainly can and sometimes
do undertake that task; but undertaking it at a sustained level of detail means that they are
indeed doing specifically legal scholarship.
A central problem for legal theory is what it means for a social system to be ‘normative’. A
‘man on the street’ view commonly grasps law along the lines of a quasi-criminal law
paradigm, that is, in terms of commands and sanctions: law tells us what we may and may
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not do, and what will happen if we transgress.  Unsurprisingly, the field of law and historical
memory has emerged largely out of controversies surrounding norms taking a
conventionally punitive form, in particular, criminal bans on Holocaust denial.
To move beyond that familiar model is to appreciate other, less obvious yet more powerful
forms of law. In addition to such anti-negationist bans, for example, states may provide for
Shoah education in primary education or in national media programming. Traditional
histories have certainly noticed as much, and yet may inadvertently present those avenues
as non-legal – as ‘alternatives’ to legal processes. That view overlooks the fact that public
education and media are just as much state domains, subject to fully-fledged legal creation
and management, as any criminal statute or courtroom.
The periodic prosecutions for Holocaust denial may boast a certain high-profile allure,
provoking all the usual roars and sneers; and yet it is the generations nurtured on a national
curriculum reinforced by regular media programming who are far more likely to carry the
state’s desired message into their broader understandings of history and society. If, for
example, we wish to identify a broad German consciousness of the Holocaust – as much
as there is such consciousness – we learn more from the basic school curriculum than from
mediatised criminal prosecutions.
As we must forever learn anew, law proceeds not merely, or even primarily, through
criminal sanctions – the baton-wielding cop lurking behind our every move. More often than
not, no such cop exists. Rather, law largely operates through less overtly punitive yet more
systemic channels, such as schools and media. (I say ‘less overtly punitive’ rather than
‘non-punitive’, since the state can of course penalise the rebellious school teacher or
broadcaster.)
Yet the paradigm of anti-negationist bans as decisive for the emergence of this new
discipline, although certainly probative, risks focussing us too narrowly on Western
assumptions. Western European bans on Holocaust denial have certainly sparked
important debates, but against a backdrop of states generally securing robust freedoms of
thought and opinion, as confirmed by those bans’ generally limited, indeed often little more
than symbolic enforcement records.
Once we venture beyond the Oder, Neisse, and Danube, we find a panoply of legal
channels exploited with far broader scope and far more questionable aims.  Russian,
Turkish, Polish, Hungarian, and other governments are using education, media, and culture
to cast their states only as victims of major atrocities, never as perpetrators. Increasingly
severe punishments threaten – and thereby silence – critical voices that would call attention
to those states’ often egregious complicities in crimes against humanity. (To be sure, we
ought not to exaggerate that distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’. Attempts by
Southern US states to eliminate histories of slavery and segregation from school curricula,
to name only one example, pursue the same anti-intellectual aims.)
A peripheral discipline?  A foundational one?
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Bearing in mind that general sense of the object of this new scholarly discipline, a further
question arises about its status. Is the discipline nonetheless an essentially specialist one,
raising questions only for small handfuls of initiates? Quite the contrary. Strictly speaking,
anything ‘past’ forms part of history. In practice, however, the discipline of law and
historical memory inevitably focusses on traumatic events, as we observe in virtually every
publication on the topic. In contemporary law, ‘traumatic’, in turn, entails essential links to
internationally recognised human rights violations.
It is no accident that international and public legal domains widely recognise human rights
as, in some meaningful sense, fundamental, that is, as foundational for the legitimacy of a
legal regime. In a nutshell: a government’s attitude towards law and historical memory
becomes a crucial, perhaps even the crucial, benchmark of its attitudes towards human
rights and towards the legitimacy of the legal regime over which it presides.
We nonetheless risk seeing the discipline as marginal because law, including human rights
law, treats public discourse as, at best, just one of a variety of human goods. ‘Rights’ of
free expression are viewed as no less, but also no more important than other human
goods, such as food, water, privacy, religion, and the like. As indeed a statement of human
goods that view is incontrovertible. It is a commonplace that free expression is ‘no good’ to
someone lacking food and water – a standpoint that, after centuries of theory, underscores
our constant tendency to theorise even the most patent political problems through a ‘state
of nature’ abstraction, as if we’re all living out in the woods, wondering whether it’s more
important to speak or to eat.
When it comes to human rights – that is, to human goods as objects of norms within fully-
fledged legal systems – it is by no means clear that free expression ought to count as ‘just
another’ right. Jürgen Habermas rightly suggests that public discourse represents a Kantian
synthetic a priori, that is, the condition for the very possibility of any seriously participatory
politics, and therefore of any legal system linked to such politics.
Yet even Habermas ultimately collapses the legal status of public discourse into the ‘right’
of free expression merely co-existing with the panoply of ‘rights’ which it is supposed to
have founded in the first instance. As I have suggested elsewhere, once we assign legal
standing to public discourse as a condition for both democracy and human rights, the field
of law and historical memory – which is nothing other than a society’s matrix of discussion
on its origins and values – can come to assume a premier place among the objects of legal
analysis.
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